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I. INTRODACTION
1. This roport aims to provide a comprehensive survey on the operation of
Euratom safeguards in the civi I nuclear fuel cycle including research
and other related activities of tho European Community. The survey
includcs the safeguards findings with particular roference to 1988, the
issues under discussion or consultation with operators or under
consultation with natlonal authoritios, a survey on the available
resourcos and an indication of the challenges to safeguards during the
yoars to come.
2. lt is intended that such a report should be prepared on a regular
bas I s.
3. The report is addressed to the Council and to the European Parliament,
which are lnvited to noto its contents.
The yJord safeguards, in the framework of tho Euratom Treaty, means the
set of measures performed to make certain that nuclear material is not
diverted from its intended and declared uses (namely to unlawful non-
peacoful appl ications) (article 77a) ) anO to implement undertakings
arising fron International Agreements concluded by the Community(Articlo 77b)). Examples of the latter undertakings are (in addition to
peaceful plodge) restr ict ions on retransfers outside the Communi ty and
certain controls on heavy water and equipment.
Safeguards is therefore not, as is somet imes mistakenly bel ieved,
concorned with nuclear safety nor with the protection of humans and of
the environment from the hazards of ionizing radiat ion nor v{ith
physical protect ir3n. l.luclOar Safoty relates to the safe design and
opgr,ation of nuclear facilities. Radiatlon protectlon controls relate
to heaith and safety, environmenta! protection, safe handl ing
procodures for nuclear materials etc. Physical protection relates to
the security moasures taken to protect material from thoft or other
misuses. Safeguards may tako advantage of such measures in designing
verification schemes but they are, in themselves, quite independent.
Wheroas physical protection is mainly the responsibi I ity of the Member
States, the Commission is responsible to apply safeguards pursuant to
Chapter Vl I of the Treaty.
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I. INTRODACTION
1. This report aims to providc a comprehensive survey on the operation of
Euratoflt safeguards in the civi I nuclear fuel cycle including research
and other related act ivit ies of the European Community. The survey
includes tho safeguards findings with particular reference to 1988, the
issues under discussion or consultation with operators or under
consultation with national authorities, a survey on the available
resources and an indication of the challenges to safeguards during the
yoars to come.
?. lt is intended that such a report should be prepared on a regular
bas i s.
3. The rcport is addressed to the Council and to the European Parliament,
which are invited to note its contents.
@
4. Tho v{ord safoguards, in tho framework of the Euratom Treaty, moans the
set of measures performed to make certain that nuclear material is not
diverted from its intended and declared uses (namely to unlawful non-
peaceful appl ications) (article 77a) ) and to implement undertakings
arising from International Agreements concluded by the Community(Articla 77b)). Examples of the latter undertakings are (in addition to
peaceful pl6dge) restrictions on retransfers outside the Community and
certain controls on heavy water and equipment.
5. Safeguards is therefore not, as is sometimes mistakenly believed,
concerned with nuclear safety nor with the protection of humans and of
ths environment from the hazards of ionizing radiation nor with
physical protect ion. lfuclear safoty relates to the safe design and
oper.ation of nuclear facilities. Radiatlon protection controls relate
to hea I th and safety, env i ronmenta I protect ion, safe hand I i ng
procadures for nuclear mater ials etc. Physieal protection relates to
the security measures taken to protect material from thoft or other
misuses. Safeguards may take aclvantago of such measures in designing
verification schernes but they are, in themselves, quite independent.
Wheroas physical protection is mainly the responsibility of the Member
States, the Commission is responsible to agply safeguards pursuant to
Chapter Vl I of the Treaty.
7.
@
8. The mandate to the Commission
of safeguards is specified In
Treaty. lt is European law.
of the European Communitios in the field
Art icles 77 to 85 of Chapter Vl I of the
Chapter I
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Chapte: Vl I of the Treaty provides for safeguards to be appl ied to al I
civ'ii nu;iaar materials stored, used or transported within the
Commur,iiy. The activities involved include therefore the main fuel
r:yc la act iv i t ies of uran ium m in ing , convers ion, enr ichment ,
faBr icai ian, porver reactor op6rat ion, reprocessing and waste storage
and disposal insofar as ores, source or special fissi le material are
con.arned. Also included are the full range of other activities vrhich
use source or special f !ssilo materials, viz: research and development,
laboratories, service activities to the nuclear industry (e.9.
analyt ical laborator ies), research reactors and the use of nuclear
mater ials in,non-nuclear act ivit ies.
The Euratom Troaty provides for the application of safeguards to all
civi I nuclear matorial as a fundamental function of Community law
establ ishing to this end a direct relat ion between the Commission and
operators. The Non-Prol lferation Treaty (NPT) provides for the
app I i cat ion of safeguards by the I nternat iona I Atom i c Energy Agency
( l.A.E.A.) in the non-nuclear weapon States of the Community. l.A.E.A.
safeguards also apply in nuclear weapon States following "voluntary
of fers" by those States. l.A.E.A. safeguards are exclusively almed at
ensuring peaceful us6 of safeguarded material and apply worlwido on a
contractual basis, viz safeguards agreemonts and entai I a direct
relation only between the IAEA and its Member States. In the Community,
the safeguards agreements (Verification Agreements) concluded by
Euratom, the Member States and the l.A.E.A. ensure the necessary
coordination between the two safeguards systems.
9. The provisions of Articles 77 to 85 of the Treaty specify:
Art. 77: ln essence, the Commission shal I sat isfy itself that the
nuclear mater ials are not diverted from their intended uses
as declared by the users and that tho provisions relat ing
to supp I y and any part i cu I ar safeguard i ng ob I igat ions
assumed by the Community under an agreement concluded with
third countries or with an international organization (e.9.
the Internat ional Atomic Enorgy Agency ( IAEA)) are compl ied
with. Pursuant to this article, Euratom Safeguards also
monitor, and report on, tho implementation of Chapter Vl of
the TreatY.
Art. 78: The declarat ion by operators of the basic technical
characteristics of the instal lations as wel I as the need
for Commission approval of techniques to be used for the
chemica I processing of i rradiated mater ia ls;
Chapter I
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Art. 79: Requirements on operators to maintain a system of nuclear
materials accounting, including recording and report ing;
Art. 80: Deposit of excess plutonium not in use;
Art. 81: Inspections; right of access; procedures in case of
oppos i t ion;
Art.82: Recruitment of inspectors. Follow-up procodures involving
Member Statos in case of infrlngenent;
Art. 83: Sanctions in case of infringem€nts by operators;
Art. 84: Scope of safeguards and crclusion for materials intended to
meet defence requlrements;
Art. 85: Adaptation by the Counci I of the procedures for applying
safoguards.
10. Commlssion Regulation (Euratom) No 3227/76 of 19.10.1976 (O.J. E.C. No
L363 of 31.12.1976), speciflos general obl igations on operators with
respcct to the provision of basic tochnical characteristics, r€cording,
report ing, advance not i f icat ion of transfers and the regui rement to
adopt Part icular Safoguards Provisions (PSP) tor each instal lat ion.
11. The Community has concluded agreements with the U.S., Canada and
Australia. To verify the implementation of the undertakings included
thorein, Euratom safeguards tracks relevant material under speclfic
safeguarding obl igations, each idontified by an appropriate code.
12. The Community has concluded three Verificat ion Agreements with the
IAEA based on model agreement INFCIRC/153, but including a protocol
regulating the interface between tho Euratom and IAEA safeguards
systems:
a. Agreementl) between the Community, its Non-Nuclear $teapon States
.(NNlvS) and the IAEA;
b. Agreement2) between the Comnunity, the United Kingdom (UK) and
the IAEA;
c. Agreement3) between the Community, France and the IAEA.
m., in IAEA document tNFctnc/lg3
. 
2) Published, p. ex., in IAEA document INFCIRC/263
, 3) Published, p. ex., in IAEA document INFCIRC/290
Chapter I
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'f 3. f n ordor to futf itt tho mandate of Articte 77 0t the Treaty, the
commlssion has, since 1958, deployed a corps of Euratom safeguardsinspoctors. The funds aro providod through buclg€t chapter 71.
14. ln accordanco with tho legal provisions rslerred to above the Euratom
safeguards inspoctors of the safeguards dlroctorat€ DG XVI l-E ("DCS")perform inspections in tho nuclear instal lations and perform relevant
headquarters accountancy evaluat ion and fol low-up.
15. Inspections and accountancy supported by appropriate logistics are the
main pi I lars of Euratom safeguards; no adequatc veriflcation can be
carried out unless these operato effectivcly.
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II. SAFEGUARDS OPERATION
16. Table ll.1 displays the number and type of installations (end 1988)
under Euraton safeguards subdivided by Member States:
Table ll.1
ffipection.Reference(insta|lationsotherthanL0F):|AEA,
the Annual Report for 1988.
2) Locat ions outside f acilit ies (LOF) are installat ions holding less than
1 ef fective kilogramme. For the def inition of an ef fective kilogram
cf. Regulat ion 3227/76, guoted under paragraph 10 above,
Art icle 36 (o).
3) In the NNI{S a number of LOF's holding t iny quant it ies of NM are , f or
. 
purposes of IAEA safeguards, combined into 1 accounting unit referred
' to as CAM (see Glossary attached).
Typc
Count r I cr
BDI( D FGRIRL I L}.IL P E(XCOII Et.R IAEAt)
Rescorch loborotoricr
Rcscorch rcoctorr t
criticol orsqtrbllar
Mincs ond conccntrotion plontr
Enriclmcnt plontt
Fue I convcrrlonr/fobrlcot ion
p I ontr
Rcproccrring plontr
Powcr rcoctoru
Storogc inrtol lot ionr
LoF2). corricru.
i ntcrmodioricr. condi t ion ing,
of hc rs
11 712
1222 l,t 1
tt51
tl
5t,+1O
t4
7 27 53
5tto7
2 221 5
21,f92
'f5 1
I
.25
5
.1020
1116 1
J
2
I
2
f0 f9126 41 2 2 35 3 15 2 1 98 1
55
68
26
,t
2E
12
123
45
355
22
45
5
13
I
50
24
109
TOTAL Eurotot 32 25 2OS l,+:t 3 2 57 3 22 17 24 175 lO 716
TOTAL IAEAl)3) 23 fr151 | 3 2 11 2 19 3 20 5 9 270
Chapter | |
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.|7. The above table | |.1 gives also the summary of the instal lations underl.A.E.A. inspection. All insta||ations in the NNWS are under t.A.E.A.
inspact ion pursuant to the Ver i f icat ion Agreement tNFCIRC/193.
Instal lat ions under l.A.E.A. safeguards in NWS are inspected by thel.A.E.A. lf designated to this of fect by the latter, pursuant to thoprovisions of tho Verification Agroements INFCIRC/263 and INFCIRC/290.
18. Among the installations listed in table ll.1 there are 17
installations, located in France and the Unitod Kingdon, referred to as
"mixed" installat ions. At thase installat ions, civil and non-civi I
mater i a I are hand I ed, processed or storod together e i ther
simultaneously or sequent ial ly.
19. The followlng table ll.2 gives the stocks of civil nuclear material by
the end of 1988 for the installations listed in table 11.1.
Table | 1.2
r) Rounded to nearest 100 t.t*) Rounded to nearost t.
rr*1 Art. 36(0) of Regulat ion 3227/76.
20. Pursuant to Art. 79 of tho Treaty and to Articles 9 to 23 ot
Regulation 3227/76, the operators of all installations must establish a
nuclear materials accounting system including recording and reporting
th6reby document ing the movements and disposition of the nuclear
material.
@intheCommissionAnnua|ReportareeItrapo|ationsand
represent the best estimates at the time of preparation, viz at a time
the exact figures cannot be avai lable.
Stocks of nuclear naterial by end 19881)
Uranium Depleted')
Natura I *)
Low Enr ichedr)
High Enr iched**)
Plutonium*t)
Thor ium*)
107 600 t
46 400 t
27 400 t
12 t
151 t
15001
Tota I effect ive kgrr*) 179 000
Chapter I I
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In other words, the up-to-date inventory of nuclear mater ial by:
- 
cat€gory of mater i a | **** )
- 
safeguards ob I i gat i on and
- 
mater i a I ba I ance areas (MBA)
as established by the operator nseds to be verified by inspectors, as
well as the f low of nuclear materials. Verif ication relates to the set
of act ivit ies independent ly performed by inspectors to establ ish the
correctness of these records on flow and inventory leading to
acceptance or rejection of the operators declarations.
21. There are several, basical ly different, safeguards verification
techniques, certain of which are quantifiable and others which are non-
quantiflable.
22. Commorcialisation of the use of nuclear energy in the Community as
wel I as the implementat ion of the NPT brought along a signif icant
adaptation of the Euratom safeguards system. This adaptation was
strongty influenced by the dol iberat ion of the safeguards Committee
hef d at tho IAEA in 197O/71. Technically it establ ished a methodologygiving the primary role of accountancy tor material balance
verification under I imited inspector access to operators data and to
the nuclear mater ial. Containment and survei I lanco measures and other
safeguards measures difficult to quantify were given less weight. On
the other hand the experlence gained in the implementation of
safeguards approaches to date shows that the information obtained
through such non-quantifiablo measures influence the decision processes
in safeguards to a substantial degree.
23. Examples of safeguards measures which provide quantified information
are measurements of nuclear material flow and inventory and information
obtained through transit accountancy. Examples of measures providing
non-quantif iable information are the verif ication and reverif ication of
the technical characteristics of a plant, the verification of the
detai led process and transfers inside a plant and containment and
survei I lance methods such as seals, camera/v ideo survei I lance and
monitor ing/logging devices. Euratom takes the view that these
safeguards measures are frequently equivalent in effectiveness to and
indissociable from those providing quantif ied information.
24. The following table ll.3 provides an indication of the verif ication
technaqu6s deployed. Table | 1.4 provides the typical frequency of
inspection and the Euratom inspection effort spent at the various types
of instal lat ions.
. ffigutation 3227/76.
Chapter I I
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Iable | 1.3
ffiataparticu|artechniqueisdep|oyedatatypeof
i nsta I I at ion as a comp lementary techn i que '
Ver if icat ion technique Type(s) of instal lation*)
verif ication and periodic
reverification of Basic Technical
Character ist ics (BTC)
a | | types
audit of accounts al I types
itom counting and identification al I tYPes
measurgm6nt
- 
u,e igh i ng
samp I i ng
non-destruct ive assay (NDA)
sample taking
assay (DA)
for destruct i ve
part icipat ion in cal ibrat ion
exercises of eguipment
appropr iate measuremonts (NDA
and,/or DA) on a low samPling
basis
research I aborator ies, research
reactors & critical assemblies
enr i chment , fabr i cat ion and
reprocessing plants(certain) power reactors(certain) storage instal lat ions
s16srs(A)
research laborator ies, research
reactors & cr i t. assemb I ies
enr i chment , fabr i cat ion and
reprocessing plants
po$,er reactors(A)
storage instal 131 ;ep5(A)
research laboratories
enr ichment, fabr icat ion and
reprocessing plants
storage instal 131 ;ens(A)
research laboratories
enr ichment, fabr icat ion and
reprocessing plants
LOF etc.
-9-
Table | 1.3
Chapter | |
(cont. )
Ver i f icat ion technique Type(s) of instal lation
conta inment and
- 
sea ls
survei I lance
camera/video survei I lanco
i ndependent mon i tor i ng of key
data (tank levels,
temperatures and other
operator data)
fol lowing deta i led process
operations and f lows within
the p I ant
moni tor ing/ logg ing systems
research laborator ies, research
reactors & critical assemblies
enr i chment , fabr i cat ion and
reprocess ing p I 3n1s(A)
pov{er reactors
storage installations
research I aborator i es(A) ,
res. reactors & crit. assembl ies
enr ichment, fabr icat ion(A) and
reprocessing plants(A)
pourer reactors
storag6 instal lations
enr i chment (A)
fabrication plants
reprocessing plants
fabrication plants
reprocessing plants
enr ichment Plants(A)
pou,er reactors
research reactors & critical
assembl ies
storage installations
Chapter | |
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Table I 1.4
*) Holders of small amounts, e.g. holding less than 0.1 ef f . kg of
depleted and natural uranium or thorium used for non-nuclear purposes
are inspected on a sampling basis or when discrepancies following
declarations (also from Other operators) need to be resolved.
ZS. In relation to tables ll.3 and ll.4 it may be noted that the frequency
and. intensity of inspections are also influenced by the establ ished
quant if ied inspect ion goals which depend on tho strategic value,
amounts and types of nuclear material, on the probabilities of
detect !on and the detect ion t imes. These quant i f ied inspect ion goa ls
are revieryed from time to time so as to take account of new safeguards
approaches and of the progress in research and development.
26. The safeguards approaches for "mixed" instal lations differ from those
applied elsewhere in respect of their objective:
- 
For instailations handling civil material exclusively the objective
se+. out in ari icle 77 Of the Treaty apFlies to all nuclear mater ial
i n i nventory or throughPut** ) .
;TT-FI uts , vrmere app I icab le , to the equ ipment .
Type of instal lation
Typ i ca I frequency of
inspect ion ranging
from to
Inspect ion effort
1988 
- 
man-days
Euratom
Research laborator ies
Research reactors & critica
assembl ies
Mines and concentrat ion plants
Enrichment plants
Convers ion and fabr i cat ion(uranium natural, LEU)
Convers ion and fabr i cat ion
(HEU and MOX)
Reprocess i ng
Power reactors
Storage installations
0t her
1/a
2/a
Ola
12/ a
12/ a
12/ a
12/ a
(v{hen not
operat ing)
2/a
1/a
0*)
12/ a
6/a
2/a
1,/week
1 /week
cont i nuous
cont i nuous
24/ a
daily
4/a
366
368
14
678
977
1 424
1 705
879
849
104
Chapter | |
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For installations handling or storing civil and non-civil material
simultaneously or sequential ly the objective set out in Art. 77 ot
the Treaty appl ies equally to this civil mater ial , a key condit ion
being that there should be no net loss in quantity and qual ity of
tho civil material in a plant**). I
27. lYhenever discropancies are detected:
- 
vrithin the operator's accounting system
- 
between two operators
- 
between operator's records, reports and inspect ion f indings
they are followed up immediately. Anomalies are unresolved
discrepancies or prima facie evidence of an irregularity discovered as
a r€sult of records/reports examination or other inspection activities
which may lead to the bel ief that the terms of the Treaty or other
legal instruments have not been respected. The resolution of anomal ies
requi res a sequence of act ions norma I ly add i t iona I to the safeguards
measures indicated in table I 1.4. Anomal i6s once ful ly establ ished,
i.e. unresolvable, would be considered by the Commission as a presumed
i nfr i ngement of the Treaty.
28. The following paragraphs of this chapter provide f indings result ing
from the appl ication of the safeguards measures in 1988.
29. The safeguards measures appl ied at th6se instal lat ions are descr ibed
in table 11.3, the inspection ef fort spent is described in table 11.4.
30. Fol lorying the reports of the inspectors, 23 (7 %) statements after
inspect ion or separate communicat ions were dispatched containing
part icular observat ions requir ing fol low-up.
31, These communications and direct consultations with operators or
government authorities aim at further improving safeguards
implementation reIating, inter aIia, to:
- 
the promptness and correctness of records and declarations;
- 
th6 inventor ies of clif f icult to access nuc lear mater ia ls;
- 
the definition of and safeguards measures to be applied to nuclpar
materials containod in wastes and discards.
32. The safeguards moasures appl ied at theso instal lations are described
in table 11.3, the inspection ef fort spent is descr ibed in table 11.4.
Chapter | |
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33. Fol lowing the reports of the inspectors the inspections oerformed in
't988 did not give r ise to part icular observat ions.
ffi
34. The safeguards measures app I i ed at theso i nsta I I at ions aro descr i bedin table 11.3, the inspection effort spent is described in table il.4.
35. Following the reports of the inspectors, g (13 x) statements after
inspect ion or separate communicat ions were dispatched containingpart icular observat ions requir ing follow-up.
36. ln relation to enrichment ptants it nay be noted:
In 1983 an international project, roferred to as the Hexa-partite
Safeguards Projoct, provided recommendations on how commercial
centrifuge enrichment plants should be safeguardad whi la minimizing
the risk of dissemination of sensitive technology.
These recommendations to the IAEA included, apart from the
"classica| " safeguards measures I isted in table | |.3 above,
"Limitod Frequency Unannounced Access" to the cascade areas during
which inspectors can convince themselves that the plants are
operating as declared by th6 operator. Euratom observes these
recommendations for the inspections conductod together with the
IAEA.
37. Whi le these recommendations havo been implemented consultations with
operators or government authorities continue to aim at further
improving safeguards implementat ion relat ing, inter al ia, to:
- 
the use of non-destruct ive inspect ion instruments inside the
cascade area versus tho appl icat ion of Containment and Survei I lanc€(C/S) devices;
- 
further improvement of the Non Destructiva Assay (NDA)
measurements for th6 deploted uranium tai ls;
- 
measures to verify conclusively that thero has been no net loss of
civil material in certain installations relating, in particular, to
procedures for the taking of the physical inventory.
38. The safeguards measures applied at these installations are described
in table I | .3, the inspoct ion ef fort spent is descr ibed in table ll .4.
a.
b.
Chapter I t
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39. Fol lowing the reports of the inspectors, 12 (15 %) statements after
inspect ion or separate communicat ions were dispatched conta ining
part icular observat ions requir ing follow-up.
40. Theso communications and direct consultations with operators or
gov6rnm6nt author it ies aim at furthor improving safeguards
implementation relating, inter alia, to:
a. Take account of certain technological dovelopments which have
strongly influenced the safoguards activities at these faci I ities,
e.g. the avai labi I ity of modern instrumentat ion based on neutron
and/or gamma technigues. These modern instruments are beingprogessively introduced in the fi€ld and will lead to more
effect i ve safeguards.
b. Test ing and implementat ion of inspect ion schemes providing for
random and/or short notice inspections.
!@
41. The safeguards measures appl ied at those instal lat ions are descr ibed
in table 11.3, the inspection effort spent is described in table 11.4.
It should be noted that for these installations the safeguards approach
6nvasages a contlnuous inspection regime.
42. Following the reports of tho Inspoctors, 26 (19 X) statements after
inspoction or separate communications were dispatchod containing
part i cu I ar obsorvat ions requ i r i ng fo I low-up.
43. These communications and direct consultations with operators or
government authorities aim at further improving safeguards
implementation relating, inter alia, to:
a. the further refinemont of modern safeguards approaches such as the
follow-up and balancing of mixes (FBOM), notably with respect to
reducing the high cost of safeguards implementation;
b. the test ing and implementat ion of further advanced safeguards
approaches;
c. comprehensive verif icat ion measurements by modern instrumentat ion;
d. physical inventory taking procedures;
e. progressive resolut ion of issues related to the "mixed" character
of certa in p fants;
f. replacement oi a large number of transports of sampies by on-site
analysis.
Chapter I I
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44. Tho safeguards moasures appl ied at those instal lations are describedin table I I .3, tha inspect ion ef fort spent ls descr ibed in table I I .4.tt should be noted that for those installations the safeguards approach
onvisages a continuous inspection regime durlng the operation of thefacilities.
45. Followlng the reports of the inspectors,2S (27 I) statements after
inspection or separate conununlcations w6ra dlspatched containing
part icular observat lons roquir Ing fol low-up.
46. Theso communications and direct consultations with operators or
government authoritios alm at furthor improving safeguards
implemontation relating, Inter alia, to:
a. ful ly transparent records/reports systems;
b. in-procoss monitoring and/or C/S applications;
c. comprehensive ver if icat ion measurementg by modern instrumentat ion;
cl . progrgssivo rosolutlon of lesues related to the "mixed" character
of certain plants;
e. replacement of a large number of transports of samples by on-site
analysis.
The safoguards moasures appl ied at these instal lat ions are descr ibed
in table 11.3, the inspectlon effort spont is described in tablo 11.4.
Following the reports of the inspectors, 35 (6 X) statements after
inspoct lon or separate communicat ions were dispatched containing
part icular obssrvat ions requir ing fol low-up.
Theso communications and diroct consultations with operators or
government author i t ies a lm at further improv ing safeguards
implementat ion relat ing, inter al ia, to:
a. step by step replacement of fi lm cameras by modern video
equ i pment ;
b. introduction, where applicable, of monitoring and logging systems;
c. re-measurement of nuclear mater ials und6r effect ive containment
and surve i | | anco (C/S) sYstems;
d. introduction of NDA measurements on fresh fuel stcred under water.
47.
48.
49.
Chapter I I
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50. The safeguards measures appl ied at these instal lations are describedin table | 1.3, the inspect ion of fort spent is descr ibed in tabte I t.4.
51 . At such installations which include those where uranium or thor ium isbeing used for non-nuclear purposes (e.g. shielcling, aircraft counter
weights, production of lamps, catalysts, ceramics) and thoseinstal latlons at the backend of the fuel cycle (not including, of
coursc, reprocessing), safeguards rel i6s nainly on non-quant ifiabte
moasures such as Basic Technlcal characteristics (BTc) veriflcations.
The discussion, howover, to whlch intensity such measures are to beperformed has not yet been concluded. As far as wasto treatment anddisposal instal lations arc concernad, safeguards techniques to be
appl ied are st ill under discussion.
52. lt should be mentioned that at these instal lations operatorsfr€quently ara not aware of their safaguards obtigations, inctuding
nuclear materials accountlng. This is why Euratom has to spend adisproport lonately high ef fort in administrat ion and other fot tow-up
moasur€s to cnsure full adheronce to the legal requirements. This
rosulted in 21 X of the cotrmunications to operators of such
i nsta | | at lons requ i r i ng fo I low-up .
- 
't6 
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III. ACCOUNTANCY
@
53. Fof loy{ing the provisions of the Treaty and Regutat ion 3227/76, a
nuclear mater ial accounting system is ostabl ished at al t instal tat ions
as described above. Roports aro submitted according to the legalprovisions to the Euratom Safeguards Directorate. Ilhere appropr iate,
accounting reports are submittod to the IAEA by Euratom, pursuant to
the Verification Agreements fol lowing procossing by Euratom.
54. At the instal lations the nuclear matorial accounting system comprises
the rscords and reports required in Regulation 3227/76 and in the
Part icular Safoguard Provisions. These records must be complete,
consistent with each other and with tho reality, and must be reflected
in the reports made to DCS headquarters. The accountancy audits are
carried out during inspections to checl( tho above, and any remarks
ar ising are advised to the operators and follov{ed up for act ions. A
part icular ly important task is the physical inventory exercise where
the book and physical inventories are vsrified, compared and any
di fferenco idont i f ied and invest igated.
55. The activities at oCS headquarters comprise the independent updating
of accounts by installation based on the reports received pursuant to
Regulation 3227/76, consistency checks between inspection findings and
accountancy reports provided by the operators, control of external
obl igations and transit accountancy.
W
5S. The account ing system for nuclear mater ial follows the classical rules
of bookkeeping vrith respect t$ the nuclear materials under safeguards,
ths basic objective being that at al I times the book inventories
ref loct the reality as e losol)' as possitrle in terms of amounts and
timing.
57. Al I nuclear materr ial account ing systems must provide for per iodic
€x€{c i ses to take and vor i fy t he phys i ca I i nventory. The frBguency
depend$ on the cletec;tion time$ which in themselv€s depend on the nature
and amount of material involverd in the f low and inventory in the
instal lat ion. Tfro t iming m8y illspeficl on ep€rat ional eon$traints. Ther
ob.!ect ive of th€l ,exerc i$s is to eompar€ the phys ica I and book
situations and nrake adjustmonts as necessary to enEjur$ that the books
cont inue to ref lect the reality as closgly as possiblc" Each ex*rrcise
leads to an evaluation to ass€rss the acceptability of any book/physical
inventory di fferenc6 in relat ion to the act ivi t ies pertormed.
Chapter | | |
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58' The compar ison betlveen inspect ion f indings and records,/reports for
act ivit ies between physical inventor ies is a further important etemenrof the chain which leads to the decision whether or not the operator,s
accounts can be accepted by the safeguards inspectors or whetherfol low-up within tho appropriate timo intervals has to be performed.The nocessity for such follow-up is frequent and requires in certain
cases long term follow up activities until a satisfactory resolution ofthe discrepancies is established. In pursuing such act ivit ies dur ing1988 Euratom did not obtain evidence of diversron.
59. The control of ertornal obligations is a further control, concerningthe adherence to the provlsions of the agreements with the usA, canada
and Austral ia and/or to tho contractual provisions requir ing peaceful
use only. The checks are based on accountancy tracking by obligation(somet imes referred to as flag control ) and encompass part icular6xports and imports and preparation of annual reports (balance sheets)
as roquired for tho third States. An important item is the
administrative proceduras and inspection actlvities related to approval
and fol low-up of erchang6s of safeguarding obl igations.
60. All such exchanges of safeguarding obligations are approved and
carried out accorcling to a set of technical criteria which guarantee
that only equivalent amounts of nuclsar materials are erchanged.
Equivalence must be obtained on the level of physical form, on thetotal element and isotopes involved. A condit ion of performing any
exchange of saf eguarding obl igat ions is that the obl igat ion involved
with the most stringent constraints shal! not tose in quality or
quant i ty.
61. International flag swaps are exchanges of safeguarding obligations
where one quantity of material is located outside the Community and the
other inside. During 1988, three such exchanges vJere performed. A
reluctance to permit such flag swaps on the part of some supplier
countrios has beon exporionced since in somo cases there was some
confusion between safeguarding obl igat ion and or igin of the nuclear
material. Origin is not tracked by DCS as it is not a concept relevantto saf eguards since, intor alia, or igin of nuclear mater ial can no
longer be verified after th6 material has entored the fuel cycle.
62. I nterna I f I ag swaps and subst i tut ion are exchanges of safeguard i ng
obl igations whero quantitios of nuclear matorial exchanged are subjectto Euratom safeguards. During 1988,2s such exchanges out of 33
requests wero approved fol lowing veriflcation by DCS that the
quant it ies involved were equivalent.
63. As regards problems with respect to certain parts of Chapter Vl of theTreaty, the role of Euratom safeguards is restricted to the monitoring
and the repor t i ng thereof .
Chapter | | |
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64. ln the Euratom system, receivers are obliged to roport movements in
oxactly tho same u,ay as tho shippor. Transit accounting is the cross
check (cal led also: tracking) at tne level of the reports received from
operators that in fact the nuclear materials are reported as having
been roceived as shipped. As far as shipments and receipts insido the
European Community are concernod the safeguards directorate fot lows up
each transfer automatical ly unti I the official confirmation of the
receipt is avai lable. This involves physical verifications, and any
d i screpancy betweon sh i pper repor ts and rece i ver repor ts automat i ca | | y
triggers a follou,-up action which may lead to an anomaly. All
discr€pancies must be resolved or justified. lf justifled, the receiveris nevertholess obllged to report the movement in the same way as the
shlpper accompaniecl by an approprlate shipper-receiver difference
repor t .
65. The response time of the Euratom safeguards system to such differences
in roports on transit is always less than a month for plutonium and
highly enriched uranium. This detection mechanism of diversions is of
fundamental importance. lt may bo recallod that it allowed two major
anomalies to be discoverod in tho past.
66. A further feature of this activity is the contribution to the
worldwide IAEA system of nucloar material control. The Community record
has always been good in this respect and this erercise has allowed
Euratom to observe that certain countries outside the Community do not
report on time or with the nocessary precision. The safeguards
directorate has helped the IAEA in solving an important problem of this
type with one country and a similar situation with another country is
receiving careful attent ion.
@
67. The abovg controls and audits provide the nocessary verifications
whether the relevant provisions of the Euratom Treaty, the agreements
with third country suppl iers and the safeguards agreements with IAEA
are being compl ied with. As rogards accountancy of safeguards
obl igat ions, balance sheets and exchanges of safeguarding obl igat ions,
no part icular observat ions apply for the yoar '1988. The usual follow-up
required in the cases of latg submission of reports, incomplete records
and roports and/or of discrepancies took place.
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68. The dovelopment of the staff of the safeguards diroctorate isdisplayed in the following tabte tv.1. This table also displays theinspection effort spent and the amounts of nuclear natorial under
safeguards.
Table lV.lr)
69. The following addit ional remarks should be taken into account when
consider ing table lV.1 :
a. Inspect ion ef fort is calculated through an internat ionally
accepted definition (reforence for example: Art.9g L of ihe
.Verification Agreement), i.e. "... a man-day being a day during
which a single inspector has accoss to a facility at any time for a
tota| of not moro than eight hours".
WintheCommissionAnnualReportareextrapo|ationsand
. 
represent the best estimates at the time of preparation, viz at a time
, the eract figures cannot be availabls.
Yco r Stoff DCS
lndcx
Opc rot I ono I
i nspcctorr
lndcx
Inrpcct I on
mondoyr
rpcnt
Indcx
Nuclcor motcriol
undcr sofcguords
in cff . kg
(divldcd by tooo) Indcx
1 982
19E3
198,+
1985
1986
1987
1 988
179 100
lEO tol
lTt 99
188 tO5
202 115
212 trE
228 t27
roE too
120 ltl
151 121
125 | 16
r34 121
rJg 129
155 1+1
4 489 100
5 tt6 111
6 U7 t35
6 225 139
6 196 r3E
e E1,0 132
7 36,t 16.{
78 t00
90 115
105 134
121 155
159 177
156 202
179 229
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b. ln addition ta the inspection effort spent by Euratom' the |AEA
has spont the fol towing inspection effort in the Community:
c. Thc incroase ( in €ffect ive kg) of the nuclear mater ials is
dominated by the plutonlum' iurrent ly most plutonium under
sateguaros is in store oither in the form of irradiated fuel
awaitingreprocessingorinoxideformincontainers.Safeguardsat
sucn storagl instat titions is based on item verification techniques
with their wel I known advantages relating to effactiveness and
cost.
70. While it would bo mislcading to link safeguards ef fectiveness
excIusivelytoinspectioneffortspentitisneverthelessafactthat
theincreaseinthenuc|earmaterialshasboenaccompaniedbyan
increase in inspectlon manpower and by an incroaso in the average
"product ivity" of the inspectors'
71.lnv|ewofthocontinuingincroasointhepeacefu|useofnuc]ear
onergy within-the Europoan Community and' in particular' the
corresponding increase of ciui t nu"i"ar mater ial to be safoguarded' the
needshouldberocognIzedtoaugmentthonumborofnucIearsafeguards
inspoctors urithin the years to come'
72. l4o(o spocifical ly, the reasons for the additional manpower
requirgments are:
a.Tomeetthecha||engeposedbythreetargereprocessingplants'
unprecedented in scale scneouied to start operations between 1989
and 1993.
b.Toensurethatthesafeguardscoveragowi||keeppacewiththe
growth oi tnu nuclear industry in the comnunity and in par icular
with the increasing use oi ptutonium In ltroX (mixed ox ide) for
nuclear electr icity generat ion purposes;
c. To furtner improve safeguards at complex instal lat ions'
part icutar ly at instat taiions u{here both civil and non-civi I
nuclear mater ial are r,anii"o uither simultaneously or sequent ially'
man-days of
inspect ion in
the CommunitY
Chapter lV
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73. Accordlngty, tho commission wlll detornlne on how the appropriate
resources can be mado available. lt shoutd bo noted that it is
necessary to rocruit persons with a sultable technical background, i.6.
with a degre€ from university or an advanced technical school combinod
with expsrience gained in the nuclcar fteld
@
74. Budget chapter 71 provides tho necessary crodits for the operation of
Euratom safeguards oxcluding staff cost and excluding cost for the
cornputer main frames:
a. Budget line B 7100: mlssionsb. Budgot line B 7110: tralning, noetings and erperts
c. Budget I ine B 7120r procuremont of lnstruments, sanples analysis
transports, temporary staff, technical and
sclent i f ic studles, informat ics software and
PCs.
In additlon, budget lino A 1120 provides for costs associated with
radioprotect lon of inspectors.
75. The following crodits were made availabte over the last f ive years( iN MECU):
1985 1 986 1987 1 988 't 989
B
B
B
7100
7110
7120
1,240
0,145
2,080
1,592
0, 151
2,2O7
1,910
0, 130
2 .051
2,010
0, 130
2 ,060
2,1OO
0, 130
2,500
Tota I 3,465 3 ,950 4,091 1,2OO 4,73O
A 1120 0,090 0,050 0,052 0,065 0,114
consumed rosources(x) 82,59 95 ,5 95,12 93,77 99,81
76. The safeguards
equipment used
A. Ganma oqulpm€nt
Chapter I v
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directorate at present possesses the fol lowing
either at the nuclear instal lat ions or at headquarters.
EURATOM EOUIPMENT 12/88
B. Noutron oqulpmcnt
1
2
10
a
6
16
7
NIS PITMAN ) handHM4 ) syst.
SAM ll (2 channel
Enr i chment meters
Pu meters
Dav idson MCA's
Si lena Ciceros
MTR scanners
2 SAM I I/SNAP
4 Cercuei I lpins)
1 Octagon (waste)
13 HLNCC (Pu)
7 NCC (fuel elements)
4 A|{CC (HEU, LEU)
2 Phonid (LEU, HEU)
3 CIND (UFG cyl. )
4 UFBR (FBR ass., Pu cyl. )1 lnventory sample counter
l Sigma (THTR pebbles)
D. 'Other' oqulpmont
ION-1 FORK (spent fuet)
UF6 mass spectrometer
UO2 mass spectrometer
potent iometer (U-factor )
var ious reference mater ia ls
Ul trasonic th ickness gauges
Load cel ls
Portable K-edge
K-edge dens i tometer
he ld
syst. )
80
6
2
11
23
6
I
C. C/S equlpmont
Minolta camera units 6
Ministar TV systems 1
MIVS TV systems 'l
EUR video systems (TLR) 1
VACOSS sea ls
Night vision devices 11
Pebble sampl ing device 10
1
I
Total: about 250 INSTRUMENTS
77. Tne application of technical measures for nuclear materials
ver ificat ion and containment/survei I lance has largely increased overthe last few years. This is i I lustrated in Fig. 1 attached for theyears 1984 to 1987. Th6 figures show (in percent) the number of
inspections where sample taking, optical survei I lance, non destructive
assay (NDA) or use of seals is involved.
78, The use of technical m€asures per type of instal lation is i I lustratedin Figs. 2-5 for NDA equipment (Fig. 2), optical surveillance (Fig. 3),
sample taking (Fig. 4) and use of seals (Fig. 5). The figures are self-
exp I anatory.
i9. 750 samples were taken by inspectors in the field, 170 samples were
analysed on site using NDA equipmenr or our portable mass
spectrometers. 580 samples tvere transported to the Commission
laboratories at Karlsruhe, lspra and Geel, where a total of 1624
chem i ca I ana I ys i s were carr i ed out .
The mean time for transport was 140 days, the mean time for analysis
about 50 days. The total delay time is still unacceotably high.
Chapter I V
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In order to improve this situation there are, on the one hand.developments underway to instal I permanent on-site laborator ies atlarge nuclear sites and on the other hand instruments are coming into
routine use which allow the measurements of most of such safeguards
samples on site thereby reducing the need for transports to a mtnimum.
80. About 18000 seals were placed by inspectors during 1988 of which about
3000 sea ls were placed on nuclear mater ia ls exported from the
Community. About 15000 seals were removed and verified at headquarters.In addition about 8000 paper seals, about 2500 special seats and 60 newf ibre optic seals were used and f ield tested in nuclear installations.
81. During 1988 more than 750 fitms from optical surveillance units have
been developed, reviewed and evaluated at Lurembourg headquarters. The
reliability of the opt ical surveillance units was 99.5X. From the new
video systems introduced in instal lations, about 300 video tapes were
replaced, reviewed and evaluated.
82. Equipment for Non Destructive Assay (NDA) was used for nuclear
mater ia I ver i f icat ions in a lmost 700 inspect ions, eguiva lent to about
32% of the total number of inspections.
83. Large plant-instal led measurement and survei I lance systems were
discussed and designed in col laborat ion with the plant operators
concerned for reprocessing and plutonium storage facilities.
|@
84. The folloy{ing main systems are presently in operation (apart from a
mult itude of individual appl icat ions) :
a. Accounting System (CMF 
- 
Comptabilit6 Matiires Fissites): ADp(Automatic Data Processing) and verification of operator reports(approrimately A24OOO I ines per year). Reports to IAEA on magnetic
tapes based on operator's reports but in a different format-
Production of numerous reports for statistical purposes and for
assisting the accounting unit in its checks.
b. Seals: ADP of approximately 18000 seals/year from fabrication,
issue, placing, breaking, through to f inal verification.
c. Destruct ive Analysis: Storage and retr ieval of data, both
administrative and technical, related to the taking of samples for
destruct i ve ana I yses.
d. Inspect ion planning and fol low-up: Input and storage of the
scheduling of each inspection. Communication to IAEA of a subset of
the plan. After the inspection, the system generates the necessary
follow-up act ions.
e. Management: List of personnel, management of missions, product ions
of mission stat ist ics, presence list etc.
f . NUMSAS (Nuclear Material Statistical Anatysis Systern): System to
evaluate differences found in material balances.
Chapter lV
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85. Personal computers have become an indispensable tool to assist
Inspectors in the field as wel I as for purposes of headquarters
evaluations. Particular attention is given to ensure compatibility
between the hardware as wel I as between appl ications at the
installations.
86. The following list gives a survey of the hardware available and used
exc lus i ve I y for safeguards:
- 
Siemens 7560, 1.7 mips and 36 terminals
- 
1 UNIX computer (Otivetti 382) for of f ice automatization inctuding
word processing etc. with 20 work stations
- 50 personal computers.
87. Relat ing to sof tware the main components are the following:
- 
Operating system 852000 al lowing batch and on-l ine processing
- 
Database management system ADABAS including query language NATURAL
- 
Database management system dBASE I | | , for the operat ion of thepersonal computers and other software for PC's.
88. lt is expected that the dovelopment of informatics will proceed in
further decentraliz ing hardware vrhi le maintaining an integrated
architecture permitting strict software compatibi I ity and, of course,
assuring strict data security (only otf-l ine ciphered connection with
the outs i de) .
89. The DG Xl l-JRC supports the Euratom safeguards directorate by
performing and financing a number of essential activities in the R&D
field:
a. Development of instruments, methods and techniques as wel I as
analysis of safeguards samples: Cost about 3,5 Mio ECU per annum.
b. Radiat ion protect ion (dosimetry and expert ise) of the safeguards
i nspec tor s .
c, Training of safeguards personnel at ISPRA, mainly at the recently
establ ished PERLA laboratory.
90. The support by DG Xl l-JRC to the safeguards directorate is coordinated
by a r igorous project managdment. The total number of such projects
amounted to 38 in 1988.
91. The continuation of the effective support by DG Xl l-JRC to the Euratorn
safeguai-ds directorate in an ef fect ive and ef f icient marlner is
considered essential.
Chapter IV
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FIG.4
Orlgln of Samples by Inetallatlon
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REI,ilIAVSWTIHTEB INTEN,I/trrcI/,d,L EVfiC E]EreT EEW (IAEA,I
The IAEA, a memb€r of the UN fami ly of special ized agencies, is the
internat ional Agency responsible on a wor ldwide basis for carrying out
safeglrards under the NOn-Pro I i ferat ion Treaty or other agreements
relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As already described
before (para. 1.12) three Verification Agreements have been concluded
between the Community, its Member States and tho IAEA. They establ ish
the responsibi I ities of Euratom, its Member States and the IAEA.
Tho structure of the relations with the IAEA may be summarized as
fol lows:
a. Participation of the tAEA in Euratom inspections. ThiS is a daily
operat iona I task. At about 50 X of a | | Euratom i nspect ions IAEA
inspectors part ic ipate.
b. Report ing of the nuclear mater ial movements and inventor ies
pursuant to the prov i s ions of the Ver i f i cat ion Agreements and
support to the IAEA system of wortd wide accounting for the transit
of nuclear materials.
c. Meetings of the Liaison Committee pursuant to Art. 25 of the
Protocol to the VA. The purpose of those mectings is to discuss,
coordinate, nsgotiate general lssues relating to or influencing
IAEA safeguards in the CommunitY.
d. Negot iat ions of documents of a technical/legal nature cal led the
Faci I ity Attachmonts (F.A.) or Instal latlon attachmonts. This
requires a major negotiation effort on al I sides. some 50
Attachments, including the attachments for netv instal lat ions and
ex iSt ing attachments in need of revision, st i | | need to be
negotiated, about 200 being already in force.
e. Numerous contacts and y{orking groups, participation in seminars'
common tra ining act ivi t ies;
t . Col laborat ion with the IAEA in the development, test ing and
implementat ion of instruments, methods and technigues.
The relat ions are sat isfactorY'
only safeguards insPectorate of
to deal with.
It should be noted that Euratom is the
a multinational character the IAEA has
93.
94.
95. The result is that a constructive
i nspectorates has deve loped wh i ch
operators and Member States.
collaboration betsreen the two
is frequently appreciated bY
Chapter V
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96' Among the issuos to be further discussed with the tAEA the foltowing
may be I isted:
a. Maintenance of a stoady progress in th0 ear ly conclusron ofFaci I ity Attachments;
b. Inspection goals and 6valuation critoria will have to be furtherdiscussed and, as far as possible, brought into I ine with each
ot hor ;
c' The implementat ion of IAEA safeguards in the Nuclear uleaponStates.
97- lt is clear that the Commission would continue to support the
worlwide role and responsabilitios of l.A.E.A. safeguards. For itspart Euratom would expect the l.A.E.A. to maintain its retationship
with the Community on the basis of the responsibilities laid down inthe Euratom Treaty.
98. A certain dupl icat ion in the appl icat ion of safeguards procedures is
however unavoidable, but :
- 
as a consequence, the effectiveness of safeguards in the Community
NNws is, when taken together, sup6rior to any other region in the
wor I d;
- 
the IAEA can participate in safeguarding activities (which Euratom
needs to perform) of an lntensity and depth which it may notperform 6 I sewh€re.
99. Thus, tho Community can claim high Non-Proliferation credentials.
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VI. TRBIVDS
100. Safeguards up to 1995 can be characterized both through the way it
will cope u,ith the increased availability and use of i;lutonium in the
commorcial fuel cycle of the Community and through the desirability to
continue to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards
operat ion in general.
101. Based on the curront operation of the industry and the construction
schedules for fuel cycle faci I it ies it is expectod that the rout ine
use of plutonium fuel in LT,R's (MOX) and in FBR's wi I I cont inue to
increase thereby significant ly increasing the throughputs of recycled
plutonium, three reprocesslng plants y{ith design throughput capacities
of up to 7 t Pu per annum commencing operation between late 1989 and
1993 in the European Community. Sev6ral fabrication plants with design
throughput capacities of around 1 t Pu per annum are presently in
operation and the op6ration of at least one more fabrication plant
with an annual design throughput capacity of up to 5 t Pu is expected
to commence in tho early 1990's.
102. Safeguards at these neu, generation facilities, some of which are of
unprecedented scale and complexity, rvill be performed in addition to
the safeguards operation In the remainder of the fuel cycle including
the back-end. ln the opsrational reality of today and in view of the
trends mentioned, the technical chal lenge to safeguards under the
Treaty relates to the operation at Light Ufater Reactors using MOX, to
MOX fabrlcation faci I ities and to reprocessing as wol I as maintaining
the standards set for other instal lation types.
103. For LWR-MOX the saf6guards approach6s have been developed and are in
tho course of implementation. Thoy do not rely in first instance on
ver i f icat ion by measurements of nuclear mater ial at tho reactors
such measurements will, of cou!'se, have to be performed in the case of
discrepancies/anomal ies - but on preservat ion of cont inuity of
know I edge through the use of v i deo and other advanced
containment/surveillance techniques during all phases of reactor
operat ion.
104. Relating to MOX fabrication faci I ities, inodern safeguards approache:;
have beon deve loped dur ing the recent years and are based on a
cont i nuous or quas i cont i nuous i nspect ion reg ime. The exper i enc€)
gained so far isi that conclusivo safeguards can be implementercl
successful ly through comprefiensive access to data an<l ts the nuclear
mater ial in ut i I iz ing both destruct ive and non-destruct ive rneesurilmenl:
techniques, conta inmont,/survei I lance techniques and the necessar)r
informat ics. The safeguards approaches have, where implemented, provert
the i r effect i veness but need to be further ref i ned due to the h i gh
cost of the i r operat ion.
Chapter V I
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105. Three large scale reprocessing plants are presently unoer
construction within the European Communrty. The attainment of
conc lus i ve safeguards for the new generat ion commerc i a I reprocess i ng
p lants presents one of the major tasxs for the 1990's. Fol lowingintensive consultations with operators and authorities concerned it
appears that conclusive safeguards wi I I be Dossible at theseinstal lat ions provided the necessary resources in terms of budget and
manpolver are avai lable. The preparations to obtain these resources areful ly under way and considerable effort has been expended in defining
the overal I approaches and detai led inspection activities which vri | |
need to be aoo I i ed.
106. From a technical point of view, a trend in installation designpresents a major cha I lenge to the appl icat ion of safeguards. For
obvious security and health physics reasons instal lations are being
designed in which the nuclear material which is subject to safeguardsis more and more inaccessible (massive transport/storage containers
not designed for routine opening; heavily shielded, secure storage of
sensitive nuclear material). Developments norv being appl ied include
advanced measurement instrumentat ion and soph i st i cated C/S systems
i nc I ud i ng mon i tor i ng/ logg i ng systems des i gned to react to and record
events which might be of interest to safeguards. These developments
will need to be continued to keep pace with design changes and adapted
to specif ic situat ions. These developments need to involve safeguards
experts i n the des ign/construct ion work at an ear ly stage before
commissioning in order to optimize safeguards necessities and to
minimize costs.
wi.cliffsl_E_r
10?, ilia affaetiveness of Euratom
rsport on the manner In which
motivated, on the promptness
State authorities fulfill the
avai lable to safeguards.
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safeguards depends as outlined in this
tho ingpoct ion service is organized and
and the extent to which operators and
rosponsibllitios and on the resources
'- ::l3lJllo", " ,ll" 
'tl'l1ili;" '1"." 'lTi;' 'ln,Ll,o,ui"ol?,no'"'i:l:l;:responsibi I ities. However, the budgetary appropriations made avai lable
. 
largely detormine the dischargo of these rosponsibilities as well as
the ability to make progrdss in the way lndlcated in this report.
'a
109. ln view of tha challenges to safeguards during the years to come,
' :ilil::11,11,Ji,.'n,,1','Tr""',"1",13".J'1,;","31.,1"i]:'::.iJ;,S['J'"'#'ll;
term plan of staffing which, if adopted and put into effect, will make
a declsive contr ibut ion to enable its rosponsibi I it ies under the
. :il:::T Jiin"'fn"'iJ;^lllil",:?.,:", l;":1ilt',;i'fillHl'^."T,i,; i?
_ 
non-proliferation safoguards in thc European Communlty to remain at
I ts presont h igh love | .
t
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Abbr /iations currentty used in Safegluards
AGR
AECB
AIEA
AQG
ARIE I
ARIE 2
AWCC
BIIFT
BTC
BWR
CAII
ccAil
CCR
CCTV
CEGB
coPo
CORE PE R
CRP
c/s
CTC
CTF
cTt
cvD
DA
DCS
DGII
DI
DOE
DPC
ECSAU
EDAN
ekg
ENDAN
FS,4
€SAPDA
ESD
FSP
EUR
FA
F ANT
F gON
GQA
H€U
HLLC
H LNCC
HSP
IAEA
1CR
tfT
IHD
/#s
/srt
JRC
JTWG
KI,IP
Advanced Gaz-cool ed Reactor
Atonic Energy Control goard (Canada)
Agence lnternationale de I'Energie Atonique (see tAEA)Atonic Ouest ions Group (see Ge,4)k,tual Rout ine /nspect ion Ef f ort (of Euraton)Actual Routine tnspection Effort (of tAEA)
Act ive Wel I Coincidence Counter
Eundesni nister i un fUr Forschung und Technot og ieSasic Technical Characteristics (see CTF)
8oi I ing Water Reactor
Catch-al I nBA (-Very snal I i nstat t at i ons)
Conltl lss ion Consultat ive des /chats et des ttarchis
Centre Connun de Recherche (see JRC)
Closed Circuit Telev isi on
Central Electricity Generating Boarcl (UK)
Coopbrat ion Pol it ique
Coni te des Repr{sentants pernanents
- COREPER
Containnent and Survei I I ance
Connunicat ion to Counci I
Caract6rist iques Techn i ques Fondanent al es (see BfC)
Conite Technique lnterninister iel pour l'Euraton
Cerenkov Viuing Device
Destructive Analysis (see also NDA)
Direction Contr6te de S6curi t6 (see ESD)
Di rector General neet ing
Design lnfornat ion
Departnent of Energy
Disposi tions Particul leres de Controle (see PSP)
European Comnlss ion Safeguards Analyt ical lleasurenent Conni ttee
Etat Dotb d'Arnenents Nuclaaires (see l{tVS)
Effect ive Ki logran
Etat Non-Dote d'Arnenents Nucl6aires (see 
^/,VtyS)Euraton Supply Agency (see S,l;
European Safeguards Fesearch and Developnent /ssoc i at ion
Euraton Safeguards Di rectorate (see DCS)
Etat des Stoc(s Physlgues (see PIL)
EURATOII
Faci I ity Attachnent
Facility Attachnents lJegot iat ing Teans
Fo I I ow-up and Bal anc i ng Of Il i xes
Groupe des Ouest ians Atoni gues (see /8G)
H ighly Enr iched Uraniun
High Level Liaison Connittee (Art. 25 Protocal VA)
High Level Neutran Coincidence Counter
Hexapart i te Safeguards Project
lnternat ional Atonic Ertergy Agency (see AIEA)
I nventory Change Report (see Ft/S)
/sotopi c Correlation Technioue
lnspect lon l/lss ion Day
I ntegr ated llon i tor ing System
lnter-Serv ice lleet i ng
Joint Research Centre (see CCP)
Joint Tean
Joint Technical llorking Graup
Key Heasurenent Po i nt ( see Pl,lP )
3>
:EUUF L //D/ ls of Er !'or cf llUF
LEU Low Enr i ched Ur an i un
LFUA Linited Frequenc) Unannounceo ,Access
Lll Lrst of lnventorv ltens (see L)l)
LC! l/ste des Oblets en lnventarre (see Ll,,
LL!-C Lower Level Liatsan Connittee (Art, 25 Profoco v'A)
LOF Locat ion Outside Facr I rty (Hold lng /ess than I EKg)
LttR L ight weter Reactor
llEA Uater i al Bal ance Area ( see ZBtl )UBR llater iat Balance ReDort ( see RBU)
uD Han-day( s )l,lUF llat er i a I Unac,;aunted For
NCC Neut ron Co i nc i dence Co I I ar
NDA Nan Destructive Analysi s (see also DA)
Nll Nuc I ear uater i al
NLIACT Nuc I ear Hater i al Account i ng Cont ro I Tean (UK)
NUTR Nuc lear l'later i al T ransf ert Report
,VrvlYS Non-Nuclear Weapon State (see ENDAN)
NPT Non-Prol iferation Treaty (see filP)
NRTA Near Real Tine AccountancY
^/U#SAS Nuclear llateri a/ Stat ist ical kcountancy SystetNVD Night Vision Device
,VIVS Nuclear Weapon State (see EDAN)
OJOII One Job-One llan
OTTO (/ist) Other Than Through Observation
PtCF Physical lnventory Control and Fol low-up
PIL Physical lnventoryListing (seeESRT
PIT PhYsical lnventorv Taking
P lV Phys i cal I nventory Ver i f i cat i on
PMP Point de llesure Pr incipal (see KllP)
PSEP Part i cul ar Safeguards Eval uat i on Procedures
PSP Particular Safeguards Provislons (see DPC)
PWR Pressurized tlater Reactor
RBtt Rapport de Bilan llati ires (see HBR)
RCD Rbunion des Chefs de Divlsion
R&D Research and Develoqnent
PyS Rapport de Variation de Stocks (see ICR)
S,4 SUPPIY AgencY (see FS.4)
s/GS/ standing Advisory Group for safeguards Inplenentation
sEAtt safeguards Effectlyeness lssessnent Hethodology
SGHIVF Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor
S/C SummarY lnventory Changes
SIF Safeguards tnplenentat ion Report ( | AEA)
SOt{ Sen i or Of f i cer s ileet i ng
SP Strateg ic PointSP/ SunnarY PhYsical Inventorv
SPD Sh i PPer / Rece iver D i fference
SS,AC State Systet of Accountancy and Control
TNP Trai te de Non-Prol iferat ion (see NPT)
TO (i ist) Through Observation (see also OTTO)
UFBR Universal Fast Ereeder Reactor Counter
VA Ver if icat ion Agreenent(s)
VDC Var i abl e Dead-t i me Counter
I{G.AR Work ing Group on 'Accountancy and Report tng
VTGGC|torRingGrouponinspectionGoa|sandacceptanceCriterta
WPDE Working PartY on Data Evaluat ion
WPtA ltorking Party on lnformatics and Accountancy
tlI
j{,4
WP lP tlork ing Party on p I ann i ng of lnspect i onsllPlT llorking Party on lnstru/rents and TechniquesWPSA llorking Party on Safeguards ApproachesWWTP tlork ing party on llork ing cond it i ons ,Training and proceduresZBll Zone de Eilan Uat iere (see nBA)
r{t
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